Planning to fail : the US wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan
The US wars in Vietnam (1965-1973), Iraq (2003-2011), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and common decisional failings. Despite its planning, the US failed to meet its early objectives in every one of these conflicts. A profound myopia at four stages of intervention helps explain why the US fought; chose to increase, decrease, or end its involvement in the conflicts; encountered a progressively reduced set of options; and settled for suboptimal results. US leaders were effectively planning to fail, whatever their hopes and thoughts at the time. American decision makers struggled less than they should have when conditions permitted good choices, and then struggled more than could matter when conditions left them with only bad choices.
Bibliographic Information
| Format: | eBook |
|---|---|
| Author: | Lebovic, James H., |
| Subject: |
National security Afghan War, 2001-2021 Vietnam War, 1961-1975 Iraq War, 2003-2011 |
| Publication Year: | 2019 |
| Language: | English |
| Published: | New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2019. |
| ISBN: | 9780190935344 0190935340 9780190937263 0190937262 9780190935337 0190935332 0-19-093534-0 0-19-093726-2 0-19-093533-2 |
| Series: | Bridging the gap Oxford scholarship online |
| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references. The US wars in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afhanistan -- The Vietnam War, 1965-1973 -- The Iraq War, 2003-2011 -- The Afghanistan War, 2001-? -- Long and costly wars : what can we learn? Description based on print version record. Previously issued in print: 2019. Specialized. |
| Course: |
HIST470 |